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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN CHURCH PROPERTY
DISPUTES - SOME CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
EvERY year, a number' of church property disputes come before the civil
courts. These controversies arise from schisms, political quarrels within
churches, unions or mergers between churches, appointment of clergy, and
expulsion of members. Each of these disputes will, in the end, touch upon
questions of right to use or right to prescribe use of church property. Tradi-
tionally states have been interested in settling these quarrels because of their
desire to have title and ownership of land settled and secure. However, courts
have always been wary of becoming embroiled in these church property dis-
putes. Until recently, this reluctance stemmed more from the belief that church
and state should be separate than from any specific dictates of the establish-
ment or free exercise clauses of the first amendment. In 1952 the Supreme
Court, in the landmark decision of St. Nicholas Cathcdral v. Kedroff,7- intro-
duced new constitutional dimensions into this area of the law. Although the
litigation dragged on until 1960, the various problems raised by the decision in
Kedroff have yet to be successfully resolved. Among these problems are: What
criteria of ownership are relevant to settlement of church property disputes?
How can courts avoid involvement in theological controversies and at the same
time successfully deal with property disputes? To what extent do the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of exercise of religion and its correlative pro-
hibition of an establishment of religion impinge upon the various methods
courts can use to settle these disputes? Because these questions have been
raised and not answered, an area of law which was relatively clear and settled
before Kedroff has become shrouded in uncertainty.
An examination of the development and growth of the prior law may illumi-
nate the considerations involved in arriving at a coherent body of rules for
settling church property disputes. The first formulation of an uniquely Ameri-
can doctrine was announced by Mr. Justice Miller in 1871, in the celebrated
case of Watson v. Jones.3 The question of slavery had deeply divided the Pres-
byterian Church. During the Civil War, the highest church authorities had
supported the Northern cause. Immediately after the war, the General Assem-
bly 4 issued instructions to the inferior governing bodies that applicants for
1. About ten cases per year from the federal courts and the highest state courts appear
in the digests.
2. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Fedchenkoff, 192 Misc. 327, 77 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff'd sub norn. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 276 App. Div. 309, 94 N.Y.S2d
453 (1950), retid, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950), rV.d and renandcd, 344 U.S. 94
(1952), new trial ordered, 306 N.Y. 38, 114 N.E.2d 197 (1953), dismissed stb nom. St.
Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 9 Mfisc. 2d 1069, 166 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1957), affirmcd 6 App.
Div. 2d 866, 176 N.Y.S2d 226 (1958), retid, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 164 N.E.2d 687 (1959), rcv'd
per curian, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
3. 80 U.S. (13 Wal.) 679 (1871).
4. The governing system of the Presbyterian Church is divided into four levels. At
the lower end are the Sessions, consisting of the Pastor and elected elders of a particular
congregation. The next higher body is the Presbytery, consisting of all ministers and one
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church membership, missionary posts or pastoral positions who had aided the
Southern cause or had agreed with the dogma of the schismatic Southern
Church that slavery was a "divine institution" should be required to "repent
and forsake these sins" before they could be received.5 These instructions
produced wide dissension in the Kentucky church, particularly within the
congregation of the Walnut Street Church. The majority of the church mem-
bers was of the anti-slavery group, but the dissenters controlled the apparatus
of the parish government. The dispute between the two factions soon centered
on control of property used by the Walnut Street congregation. The Kentucky
courts ruled for the pro-slavery minority,.holding that a decision of the General
Assembly in favor of the majority was ultra vires under the church constitu-
tion.6 After this setback in the state court, the anti-slavery group managed to
get the case into the federal courts on diversity grounds. 7 The circuit court
ruled that the anti-slavery group had the right to the church property. The
Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the anti-slavery faction alone had
been recognized by the General Assembly, the highest church authority.
In searching for a rationale, Justice Miller was faced with a paucity of fed-
eral precedent s and a divergence of opinion in the state courts.0 There was,
ruling elder from each congregation within a district. Next is the Synod, made up of all
ministers and one ruling elder from each congregation in a larger district. The suprente
authority is vested in the General Assembly, made up of ministers and elders commissioned
from each Presbytery. In Watson v. Jones, the chain of command involved the (nation-
wide) General Assembly, the Kentucky Synod, the Louisville Presbytery, and the Session,
board of trustees and congregation of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louis-
ville. Id. at 727.
5. Id. at 691.
6. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1867). The church constitution was In-
terpreted very narrowly, because the court felt that to allow the General Assembly to
determine its own jurisdiction would substitute the whim of the Assembly for the written
constitution as the law of the church. "[T]he constitution having been adopted as the
supreme law of the church, [it] must be supreme alike over the assembly and people." Id.
at 349. The Kentucky court went so far as to draw analogies between the church and fed-
eral Constitutions to show that the General Assembly had exceeded its authority. Id. at
357-59. However, this court may have been itself subject to ambivalent feelings on the
slavery question. A year later, in Gartin v. Penick, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 110 (1868), the same
court in a similar case declared that ". . . President Lincoln's proclamation of emancipa-
tion had aggravated the horrors of the war, and perverted it from a defense of the Union
into a military crusade against slavery. .. ." Id. at 129. Again this court found that the
General Assembly had exceeded their authority in requiring the loyalty oath and the re-
nouncing of slavery as a condition of membership in the Presbyterian Church.
7. The case was brought by three parishioners who lived across the Ohio River In
Indiana. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 694 (1871).
8. Church property disputes were only allowed into federal courts on grounds of
diversity. No federal question was thought to be raised, principally because the fourteenth
amendment was only a few years old, and the courts were not yet ready to enforce first
amendment guarantees through the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) for a history of the incorporation of the first amendment in religious
liberty cases.
9. The New England courts leaned toward a doctrine of congressional autonomy, while
elsewhere the courts favored an implied trust theory. Under the New England doctrine,
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however, a clear body of English doctrine holding that church property was
the subject of an implied trust in favor of those who adhered to the faith of
the founders of the church. This doctrine was first fully articulated in an 1817
case, Attorney General v. Pearson,° in which a congregation had become dis-
tressed when their minister, after preaching the Unitarian doctrine for three
years, suddenly switched to Trinitarianism. Lord Chancellor Eldon, announc-
ing the opinion of the court, said:
[W]here a congregation has become dissentient among themselves, the
nature of the original institution must alone be looked to ... and.., to
refer to any other criterion - as to the sense of the existing majority -
would be to make a new institution, which is altogether beyond the reach,
-and inconsistent with the duties and character, of this court."
Lord Eldon provided these criteria to determine "the nature of the original in-
stitution":
[When] it cannot be discovered from the deed declaring the trust what
form or species of religious worship was intended, the Court [can inquire]
into what has been the usage of the congregation in respect to it; and...
[it is] the duty of the Court to administer the trust in such a manner as
best to establish the usage, considering it as a matter of implied contract
between the members of the congregation.1
The opinion made it clear, however, that it would be rare for a court to be un-
able to determine what form of worship was intended by the trust deed. 3 The
English doctrine thus froze the property use within a church to the faith of
the founders of that church.Y4
the congregation was the basic church entity, no matter what form of Church government
the mother Church might espouse. The implied trust doctrine of the Southern, WVestern
and Middle Atlantic states in essence held that the church property vras impressed with
a trust for the maintenance of the forms of ecclesiastical government set up by the founders.
See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 HAnv.
L. REv. 1142, 1149-54 (1962) and cases cited.
10. 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817). Also see Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow
1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813) (Scot.), also decided by Lord Eldon.
11. 3 Mer. 400-01, 36 Eng. Rep. at 150.
12. Ibid.
13. In the instant case, Lord Eldon made a searching examination of the Toleration
Act (1 W. & M. c. 18) by which he presumed to show that since Unitarianism remained
illegal after this Act, it was highly likely that the original founders espoused some form
of Trinitarianism, even though the church trust-deed did not so specify. The case was
finally sent to a Master for adjudication of the issues involved, including the question of
original doctrine. 3 Mer. 419-20,36 Eng. Rep. 157.
14. In Attorney General v. Pearson, note 10 supra, the court construed a deed to a
single church building. It was not forced to decide whether the "faith of the founders" of
an entire church was to be measured at the time of donation of property or at the original
founding of the parent church. The logical result of the latter rule would be that a minor-
ity, however small, could force a majority of an entire church to conform to the doctrines
of the founders or relinquish the church property. This actually happened in 1904 when
the House of Lords held that all the properties of the Free Church of Scotland should be
awarded to a miniscule minority having less than 30 clergymen. Free Church of Scotland
v. Lord Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (Scot.). Parliament reversed this decision the next
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In Watson v. Jones Justice Miller rejected the English doctrine and at-
tempted to develop a new set of rules designed to cover all church property
disputes. The first of his three rules recognized applicability of the trust theory
only in the situation where the trust deed prescribed some specific form of
religious doctrine or belief, and where any members of the present congre-
gation who adhered to the specified doctrine wished to use the property.10
Mr. Justice Miller felt that there were strong reasons for refusing to follow
the English trust theory in situations in which the deed of trust did not specify
the religious doctrine to be followed. The English rule would require review of
decisions of church authorities by civil courts - "an appeal from the more
learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less
so."'' 6 Another reason for limiting the English rule was to insure adherence to
the peculiarly American policy of separation of Church and State. Mr. Justice
Miller postulated that religious freedom included-
The right to organize voluntary religious associations .. .and to create
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of ...members, con-
gregations and officers .... 17
Those who unite themselves in such religious organizations "do so with im-
plied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it."'1 Therefore,
if secular courts could reverse a church decision and allow a dissatisfied member
to revoke his original consent, the mutual consent of all the members would be
vain and the courts' action would lead to "the total subversion of such religious
bodies... ."1 From these assumptions, Mr. Justice Miller concluded that true
separation of church and state could be achieved only by treating church de-
cisions as final.2 In this way, civil courts could remain aloof from theological
year, allowing the majority to regain control of the property - 800 churches, three uni-
versities and more than £ 1,000,000 of invested funds. Churches (Scotland) Act, 1905, 5
Edw. 7, c. 12. See also Epaphroditus Peck, Amcricans Versus British Ecclesiastical Law,
15 YALE L.J. 255 (1906).
15. [W]hen the property... has been, by deed or will of the donor ... by the express
terms of the instrument devoted to the teaching, support, or spread of some specific
form of religious doctrine or belief . . .. it would seem ...the obvious duty of
the court ... to see that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust....
So long as there are persons qualified within the meaning of the original dedication
... and so long as there is anyone so interested in the execution of the trust as
to have a standing in court, it must be that they can prevent the diversion of the
property or fund to other and different uses.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23.
16. Id. at 729.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribu-
nals for the decision of questions arising among themselves that those decisions
should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such
appeals as the organism itself provides for.
[Vol. 74: 11131116
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disputes.' In addition, according finality to the decisions of church authorities,
rather than testing church doctrine against the beliefs of the founders, would
allow natural growth and change in the doctrines of the church.
Justice Miller next concentrated on a search for the proper decision-maling
body within a church. He saw a fundamental distinction between the govern-
ment consented to by the members of congregational churches and that con-
sented to by members of hierarchical churches. In a congregational church the
members consent to abide either by the will of the majority or by the decisions
of the elected elders. In a hierarchical church, the "whole body" speaks through
the highest church authority. The second and third rules of Watson v. Joncs,
therefore, to be applied in the absence of specific trust provisions, encompassed
the forms of ownership of property in congregational and hierarchical churches.
In a church which is, as to property matters, "governed solely within itself,"
the court would enforce the decision of the majority or the elected elders ;m in
churches where the "religious congregation... holding the property is but a
subordinate member of some general church," the civil courts would defer to
the decisions of the highest authority of the general church.P
21. Mr. Justice Miller emphasized that even the church determination of its own juris-
diction was to be accorded finality:
There is, perhaps, no word in legal terminology so frequently used as the word
jurisdiction, so capable of use in a general and vague sense, and which is used so
often by men learned in the law without due regard to precision in its applica-
tion.... [I]t is easy to see that if civil courts are to inquire into all these matters,
the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the wntten
laws, and fundamental organizatlon-of any religious denomination may, and must, be
examined into with minuteness and care, for they could become, in almost every
case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be deter-
mined in the civil court. This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of
construing their own church laws, [and] ... open the way to the ... [English]
evils..
Id. at 732-33.
22. In the case of property held by a religious congregation
governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by such other
local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical govern-
ment .... the rights ... to [such] property (in case of schism) must be deter-
mined by the ordinary principles -which govern voluntary associations .... This
ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of those who com-
prise the legal or regular brganization: for, if such was permitted, a very small
minority ... might be found to be the only faithful supporters of the religious
dogmas of the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed upon the
property when purchased or given, the court will not imply for the purpose of ex-
pelling from its use those who by xegular succession and order constitute the church,
because they may have changed in tolne respect their views of religious truth.
Id. at 722, 724-25.
23. [W]here the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the property is
but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are
superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more
or less complete, in some supreme adjudicatory over the whole membership of that
general organization . . . [w]henever the questions of discipline or of faith or
1965] 1117
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In applying his rules to the case at hand, Miller began by dismissing as
irrelevant the fact that title to the Walnut Street property resided in the board
of trustees, since they were not significant in the scheme of church government
but simply held the land for the use and benefit of the congregation - the true
body of the church - who alone had the rights of user in the building.2 4 This
"true body" was to be defined in cases of dispute by the General Assembly, "
the highest church authority. Thus that portion of the congregation recognized
by the General Assembly was entitled to use and enjoyment of the church
property.
There will be times, however, when finding the authoritative tribunal with-
in a church will not resolve the dispute. The task of determining the extent of
that tribunal's power over church members may still remain. Watson v. Jones
assumes that power to be plenary. Many courts since that decision, however,
though recognizing its status as a leading case, have been unwilling to recog-
nize such unlimited power in the hands of church authorities. The policy of
complete deference to church tribunals was quickly eroded as the courts began
to realize that the consent of an individual member to be governed may not
have been unconditional. The courts began to demand from the church tribunals
adherence to some rudimentary notions of fairness. This erosion began in
Bouldin v. Alexander 26 with an implication that the court would only defer to
a church tribunal which had followed its own procedural rules. In that case,
the Supreme Court, in holding that the minority of a congregational church
could not subvert the will of the majority, said: "In a congregational church,
the majority, if they adhere to the organization and the doctrines, represent
the church."27 The requirement of procedural regularity modifies the doctrine
of Watson v. Jones by imposing traditional notions of fairness on the church
tribunals.
Beginning with the limitations expressed in Bouldin v. Alexander, the fed-
eral courts since Watson v. Jones have examined church decisions, sometimes
rather closely, to ensure that these decisions have been fair and just to disput-
ing church members, within the context of church doctrine and procedures.
Brundage v. Deardroff,2s for example, involved a dispute between two factions
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept
such decisions as final, and as binding upon them, in their application to the case
before them.
Id. at 722, 727.
24. The trustees of the church had no power to control use of the property, since they
held possession for the true body of the church, the "persons who by the constitution,
usages and laws of the Presbyterian body, are entitled to that use." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
at 720.
25. Id. at 726-27.
26. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
27. Id. at 140. (Emphasis added.)
28. 55 F. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893). The case in the district court was heard on a
demurrer on grounds that the minority party plaintiffs had a remedy at law by ejection
rather than in equity. This demurrer was overruled. Id. at 842.
[Vol, 74 : 1113ills
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of the Church of United Brethren of Christ, a national hierarchical church,
concerning a new declaration of faith and a new constitution which had been
adopted by a majority vote at a regularly held church convention. Both warring
factions claimed that the other had seceded, and each faction had established its
own hierarchy, which it claimed to be the true governing authority of the
church. After distinguishing Watson v. Jones on factual grounds, Judge Taft
interpreted that case as laying down the proposition that
only a bona fide decision [by a church tribunal] of the fundamental law
of the church must be recognized as conclusive by civil courts. Clearly,
it was not the intention of the court to recognize as legitimate the revolu-
tionary action of a majority of the supreme judicatory, in fraud of the
rights of a minority seeking to maintain the integrity of the original
compact 29
The new constitution and the procedures followed in ratifying it were then
examined at length, and the court held that a vote of 50,000 for amendment
of a total of 204,000 church members did not satisfy the church constitutional
requirement of a two-thirds vote, that the amendment was void, and that there-
fore the minority group which adhered to the old constitution was entitled to
the property.3 0
The court of appeals, in reaching the opposite result,31 did not question the
propriety of Judge Taft's examination of the fairness of the church tribunal's
action, but after a detailed examination of the church doctrine, decided that
the church conference had the power to amend the church constitution, and also
to rule on the procedures for amendment. Apparently the 50,000 votes were
the most ever polled in a United Brethren election, and proper notice had been
given to all concerned. The court found, therefore, that the election procedure
was proper and that the requirements of the church constitution had been satis-
fied.32
The modification of Watson v. Jones by later case law is best summarized
in Mr. Justice Brandeis' restatement of the Watson rule in Gonzalez v. Arch-
bishop.m Though the holding followed Justice Miller's opinion in giving effect
to the ruling of the highest church authority, the statement of the rule the
29. Id. at 847-48.
30. Id. at 849.
31. 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899).
32. Other courts have also inquired into the procedural aspects of church decisions.
See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. First English Lutheran Church, 47 F. Supp. 954
(W.D. Okla. 1942), rev'd, 135 F2d 701 (10th Cir. 1943); Barkley v. Hayes, 203 Fed. 319
(W.D. Mo. 1913), aff'd sub nora. Duvall v. Synod of Kansas, 222 Fed. 669 (8th Cir.
1915), aff'd sub non. Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1918).
33. 280 U.S. 1 (1929). The decision of church authorities was allowed to stand in
denying a chaplaincy to a boy of 14 who had taken no religious vows. The chaplaincy had
been established by the boy's ancestor, and it was provided that the chaplaincy would re-
main in the family as long as someone was qualified. The boy's theory was that he could
receive the money from the chaplaincy fund, and use part of it to have the requisite masses
said by a priest. The Archbishop of the diocese refused to approve this arrangement, and
was upheld by the civil courts.
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courts were to apply in church disputes significantly expanded Miller's original
formulation:
In absence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil
rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,
because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.84
Under this rule the role of the civil court includes an examination of the fair-
ness of the chur6h proceedings both to determine the good faith of the church
authorities ("absence of fraud, collusion") and also to determine whether the
church tribunal has blatantly disregarded its own rules ("or arbitrariness").
In sum, the line of cases culminating in Gonzalez v. Archbishop diluted the
Watson principle of absolute deference to church authorities. Implicit in these
cases was the concept that the consent of the members to be governed by the
church authorities did not envision fraudulent, arbitrary, or collusive action by
these authorities.85 This is not to say that church rules and doctrine, though
seemingly arbitrary or unfair in the eyes of the outsiders, should not be en-
forced, but that the church and the member are bound by existing rules. These
rules can, of course, be changed in accordance with the church's procedure for
altering such rules, and in determining the validity of such change, civil courts
once again should give heavy weight to the findings of the church tribunals.80
While the rules of Watson v. Jones were being modified to embody a con-
cept of fairness, courts continued to overlook a conceptual difficulty within the
34. Id. at 16.
35. A further caveat, of course, is recognized when the doctrines of a church run
directly counter to state policy. The usual finding of a civil court will be that such an
organization is not really religious in nature, and thus not entitled to the deference pre-
scribed in Watson v. Jones. Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1924), illustrates tile
considerations involved in determining whether or not a church authority is barred by
public policy from exercising control over the property rights of a member. Hansel sued
the founders of the "Israelite House of David," a community organized for supposedly
religious purposes, to have property reconveyed which he had deeded to the church on
joining.
The court interpreted the rule of Watson v. Jones as follows:
If the religious doctrines promulgated by [the founder] and accepted by the Israelite
House of David violate no law or rule of public policy, the courts have no power to
interfere with the practice or the teachings of that faith, or afford any relief to one
who voluntarily withdraws or has been rightfully expelled for the causes named
and in the manner provided by the laws or rules or regulations of the society,
Id. at 270. The court held that the "House of David" failed at the first test. The organil.
zation was found to be not religious, but only a cloak to allow the founder to indulge in
his proclivity of seducing the women of the group under "religious" pretexts, Clashes be-
tween public policy and religious practice have involved infer alia plural marriages, Rey-
nolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); The
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1890) ; and use of religion in a conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
36. For an example of this deference, see the opinion of the court of appeals in Brun-
dage v. Deardorf, 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899).
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rule encompassing hierarchical churches. Mr. Justice Miller never defined dear-
ly the way a. hierarchical church "owns" or "holds" property. In most hier-
archical churches, the church authorities do not hold property in fee simple;
rather ownership is a more complex bundle of discrete rights, distributed
among various members of the church. Three major attributes of ownership
may be isolated - formal title, right to beneficial use, and right to prescribe
use. Mr. Justice Miller correctly recognized that the location of formal title
was meaningless for the purposes of resolving property disputes. He further
realized that though the right of beneficial use might lie in a congregation,
this attribute was not dispositive. Instead of concentrating upon the right to
prescribe use, however, Mr. Justice Miller focused on the right to define mem-
bership, apparently assuming that the latter encompassed the former. Although
this assumption may be valid in the great majority of cases, it diverts attention
from what should be crucial in disputes over church property - which body
within the church has the right to prescribe beneficial use. In those cases in
which the church organization is such that the right to prescribe use is not
coterminus with the right to define membership, the misleading focus of Wiat-
son v. Jones may produce a result unwarranted by the actual church rules.
Master v. Second Parish of Portland 3 7 illustrates the danger of mechanical
application of Watson v. Jones. The case involved a merger between a Con-
gregational and a Presbyterian church. The Presbyterians sold their church
and moved into the Congregational Church. The proceeds of the sale were
applied to the debts of the two merging churches and the balance was held for
the united congregation. The new organization hired a Presbyterian pastor
and practiced the Presbyterian faith. The articles of union provided that in
case of dissolution of the united church, the property was to be apportioned
according to the present valuation and contributions of each merging group.P
Subsequently a nation-wide schism occurred in the Presbyterian Church, and
the congregation voted 76 to 1 to secede from the Presbyterian Church and
join a newly formed body called the Orthodox Presbyterian Church of Ameri-
ca. The Presbyterian Synod of Newburyport refused to allow the congregation
to secede, and the ensuing quarrel over the church property was brought be-
fore the federal courts.
The district court framed the issue correctly:
It is not a question as to which of two parties in a Presbyterian church
shall have possession of Presbyterian property .... The question is, to
what extent did the agreement [to merge] make [the Congregational
church] Presbyterian property and subject to Presbyterian judicatory
control ?8
However, the district court did not find it necessary to proceed to the ques-
tion of what property rights the congregation had surrendered to the Presby-
terian authorities. Instead, it chose to apply Article I, Section 3, of the Maine
37. 36 F. Supp. 918 (D. Me. 1940), aff'd, 124 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941).
38. 124 F2d at 625.
39. -36 F. Supp. at 926.
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Constitution, which it interpreted as imposing a congregational form of church
government on all churches within the State, regardless of the actual church
polity.40
The court of appeals, per Judge Magruder, in affirming the district court,
neatly sidestepped the question of whether the state constitution was applicable,
and disposed of the case on the ground that the Presbyterian hierarchy had
never acquired the right to prescribe use of the property. In support of this
conclusion he pointed out that the trustees of the former Presbyterian Church
had ceased to function after the merger, the property of the merged congre-
gation being administered by the trustees of the former Congregational Church,
and further that the articles of merger provided for division of the property
in the event of dissolution of the merged church. Judge Magruder admitted
that the old Portland Presbyterian Church had been under the control of the
national Presbyterian Church hierarchy. However, he reasoned that the merger
agreement gave the new congregation only the right to use and occupy the
church by license of the old Congregational congregation, which did not sur-
render enough of its autonomy to transfer control of the church building to
the Presbyterian hierarchy.41 If the court of appeals in Master had applied
the rule of Watson v. Jones literally, merely looking to the decision of that
body having the right to prescribe membership, it would have been forced to
defer to the decision of the Presbyterian hierarchy. Master thus illustrates that
the Watson v. Jones assumption that the right to prescribe use is always found
in the church hierarchy is an overgeneralization. Courts must therefore be
particularly careful to identify in each case the location of the right to pre-
scribe use of the property in question.
By 1950, the principles of Watson v. Jones, modified to minimize arbitrary
action by church tribunals, though not of constitutional status, were widely
followed by state and federal courts.42 The Master case had recognized the
40. The relevant section reads as follows:
[AIl1 religious societies in this state, whether incorporate or unincorporate, shall at
all times have the exclusive right of -electing their public teachers and contracting
with them for their support and maintenance. ME. CONsT. art. 1, § 3.
41. Whether the Presbyterian hierarchy was entitled to the surplus of the proceeds of
the sale of the old Presbyterian church after debts had been paid, or reimbursement for
funds paid from these proceeds to settle the debts of the Congregational church, was not
decided.
42. Sims v. Greene, 160 F2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947), illustrates. The case involved an
argument between two ministers, each claiming to be the Bishop of Philadelphia, African
Methodist Episcopal Church. The district court issued a temporary restraining order to
the plaintiff, but the court of appeals reversed and directed the district court to proceed
to a hearing on the merits. In laying down guidelines for the court below to follow, the
following propositions were advanced:
a) Pennsylvania law, under Erie, must be applied.
b) Pennsylvania law requires inquiry as to the applicable church law, a determitation
whether the church law has been followed by church tribunals, and enforcement of
the church order if it has been reached legally.
The district court in deciding the case, 76 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Pa. 1947), investigated the
church law very thoroughly, and was able to avoid the theological questions in deciding
1122 [Vol. 74: 1113
HeinOnline -- 74 Yale L.J. 1122 1964-1965
CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES
major conceptual difficulty inherent in Watson v. Jones and had pointed the
way to its resolution. Thus the doctrine for resolving property disputes within
churches had become relatively dear, and courts apparently had little difficulty
in applying it. This calm was rudely shattered in 1952 by the Supreme Court
opinion in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.43 The Kedroff opinion purported
to raise Watson v. Jones to constitutional status, and thereby injected the first
amendment issues of establishment and freedom of exercise into every case
involving a dispute over church property. However, in Kcdroff, the Supreme
Court failed to realize that the application of Watson v. Jones might itself be
viewed as violating the constitutional prohibitions against establishment of or
denial of free exercise of religion. This inconsistency within the Kedroff opinion
has thrown the law surrounding church property disputes into uncertainty.
In Kedroff the property right in dispute was the use and possession of St.
Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. The Cathedral, since 1905 the seat of
the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of the Diocese of North America, had been
built partly with money donated by the Orthodox Church in Russia. The rival
claimants were the Orthodox Church in Russia (Russian Church) and the
Russian Orthodox Church in America (American Church), which claimed to
be an autonomous branch, administratively independent of the Russian church.
The Cathedral became the focus of the quarrel between the two church groups
in 1945, when the St. Nicholas Cathedral Corporation, controlled by the Ameri-
can Church, sued the representative of the Russian Church in ejectment. The
plaintiff corporation had held title 4 to the Cathedral since 1925 but had been
out of possession since that time. The defendants, however, had only gained
that the decision of the church had been arrived at legally and fairly. See also Williams
v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 So. 2d 101 (1952) ; Knauss v. Seventh-Day Adventist Ass'n, 117
Colo. 541, 190 P.2d 590 (1948); Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137
Conn. 1, 74 A2d 203 (1950); First Free Will Baptist Church of Blounstown v. Franklin.
148 Fla. 277, 4 So. 2d 390 (1941) ; Church of God of Decatur v. Finney, 344 IlL App. 598,
101 N.E.2d 856 (1951) ; Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943) ; Hoff-
man v. Tieton View Methodist Church, 33 Wash. 2d 716, 207 P.2d 699 (1949). Some states
still adhered to a literal reading of Watson v. Jones: Maxwell v. Brougher, 99 Cal. App.
2d 824, 222 P.2d 910 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Pencader Presbyterian Church v. Gibson, 26
Del. Ch. 375, 22 A.2d 782 (1941); Jenkins v. New Shiloh Baptist Church, 189 Md. 512,
56 A.2d 788 (1947).
43. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
44. Title to the Cathedral had undergone several rather complicated convolutions
since its construction. In the beginning, in 1899, title resided in Evdokim, the first Arch-
bishop. In 1905, Evdokim transferred title to a corporation formed under the laws of New
York, the trustees of which were, the Russian Ambassador, Cassini, and the New York
Consul-General, Gustinoff. This corporation held title until 1916, when they returned it to
Evdokim once again. In 1917, Evdokim left for Russia and returned the title to the Cor-
poration (Oustinoff and Cassini). In 1925, title was transferred to St. Nicholas Cathedral
of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America. This was a new corporation (plaintiff
in the action for possession of the Cathedral) whose official head w.as Platon, the then
ruling Bishop of the North American Diocese. Brief for Defendantk pp. 50-51, St. Nicholas
Cathedral v. Kreslik, 7 N.Y2d 191 (1959).
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possession shortly before the action was commenced. At approximately the
same time, the New York legislature added to its Religious Corporations Law
article 5-C, which declared that all New York churches of the Russian Or-
thodox faith were now under the administration of the American Church. It
defined the Russian Church in America, provided for re-incorporation of Rus-
sian Orthodox churches, and described the government of and powers and
duties of trustees of such churches.45 The plaintiff claimed the right to use and
possession of the Cathedral by virtue of the statute. The defendants argued that
the statute violated the first and fourteenth amendments, because it denied the
Russian Church freedom of exercise of religion by refusing its appointee the
use and possession of the Cathedral.
The New York Court of Appeals directed judgment for the American
Church,40 holding article 5-C constitutional and dispositive of the case. The
Cathedral, the court said, was within the purview of the statute, and under it
the trustees of the St. Nicholas Cathedral Corporation were bound to adminis-
ter the property under the laws of the Russian Church in America. The court
maintained:
the primary purpose of the Religious Corporations Law is to provide for
an orderly method for the administration of the property and temporalities
dedicated to the use of religious groups and to preserve them from ex-
ploitation by those who might divert them from the true beneficiaries of
the trust.47
The court went on to hold that the legislature, to effect this purpose, was free
to intervene when the "accustomed beneficiaries of religious properties are
... threatened with their loss. . . ."4 The accustomed beneficiaries were so
threatened because, as the legislature had found, "the Moscow Patriarchate
was no longer capable of functioning as a true religious body, but had become
a tool of the Soviet Government primarily designed to implement its foreign
policy."40 The legislature, said the court, had therefore found that the Ameri-
can Church rather than the Russian Church "may be relied upon to carry out
more effectively and faithfully the purposes of this religious trust."50 The court
analogized the situation to that in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds.61
Chief Justice Conway read Douds as upholding the non-Communist oath pro-
vision in the National Labor Relations Act:
not because any such oath requirement was generally within the power of
Congress, but because the specific evil, the existence of which Congress
was assumed to have reasonably found as a fact, was such that some in-
fringement upon traditional liberties was justifiable. The case illustrates
well that enactments which might seem unconstitutional on their face may.
45. N.Y. RELIGIOus CoRp. LAw art. 5-C, §§ 105-nt (1952).
46. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
47. Id. at 29, 96 N.E.2d at 72.
48. Id. at 30, 96 N.E.2d at 72.
49. Id. at 32, 96 N.E.2d at 74.
50. Id. at 30, 96 N.E2d at 72.
51. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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yet be sustained if the factual background found by the legislative body
warranted an extended exercise of its powers5 2
Thus the New York statute was held constitutional because any possible in-
fringement of religious freedom was thought to be indirect and justified by a
substantial state interest. In its holding, therefore, the Court of Appeals did
not see the need for determining whether the American Church had in fact
gained its autonomy, or whether the Russian Church could function freely un-
der the Soviet Government, but simply accepted the conclusions of the legis-
lature.53
The Supreme Court reversed,r  and held that Benjamin, the bishop appoint-
ed by the Russian Church, was entitled to possession of the property. The
Court concluded, through Mr. Justice Reed, that the New York statute
undertook by its terms to transfer the control of the New York churches
of the Russian Orthodox religion from the central governing hierarchy of
the Russian Orthodox Church . . . to the governing authorities of the
Russian church in America .... Such a law violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. It prohibits in this country the free exercise of religion.ra
The Supreme Court thought that the New York court's reliance on Douds
was unsound. Mr. Justice Reed characterized New York's statute as:
by fiat [displacing] ... one church administrator with another. It passes
the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to
another. It thus intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the
power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary
to the principles of the First Amendment. Such prohibition differs from
the restriction of a right to deal with Government allowed in Douds, in
that the Union in the Douds case had no such constitutionally protected
right. New York's Article 5-C directly prohibits the free exercise of an
ecclesiastical right, the Church's choice of its hierarchy 0G
Underlying this reasoning is an assumption exactly opposite to that of the
New York court. The Supreme Court assumed that the right to prescribe the
use of the New York churches lay with the Russian Church. This assumption
allowed the court to categorize the New York Legislature's action as a dis-
placement of one church administration with another. It is true that the New
York Legislature's action was intended to vest control of church property in
52. 302 N.Y. at 31, 96 N.-.2d at 73.
53. "Whether we, as judges would have reached the same conclusion is immaterial. It
is sufficient that the Legislature reached it, after full consideration of all the facts:' Id. at
33, 96 N .E2d at 74.
54. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
55. Id. at 107.
56. Id. at 119. This interpretation of the Douds case neglects to mention that Chief
Justice Vinson, the author of the opinion, admitted that
by exerting pressure on unions to deny office to Communists .. . [the provision
maling the non-Communist affidavit applicable] has the... effect of discouraging
the exercise of political rights protected by the First Amendment. len who hold
union offices often have little choice but to renounce Communism or give up their
offices.
339 U.S. at 393.
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the American Church, whether or not the Russian Church had a claim of
right.57 Whether Article 5-C did in fact transfer control of the church prop-
erty, however, depends upon who had the right to prescribe use of the prop-
erty, before the legislative action. If this right already resided in the American
Church, the New York statute did nothing but recognize this fact, no matter
what the intent of the legislature was. Under these circumstances, striking
down the statute would not be sufficient to decide the case.
The holding that the "transfer" violated religious freedom in that it inter-
fered with the right of the church to appoint clergy is irrelevant, Both the
American and Russian Churches could, and did, appoint bishops. The question
was who had the right to appoint the bishop of St. Nicholas Cathedral. The
answer to this question inescapably involves locating the right to control use of
that property. The Supreme Court did make a reference to this underlying
issue, but it did so without sufficient discussion:
The record before us shows no schism over faith or doctrine between the
Russian Church in America and the Russian Orthodox Church. It shows
administrative control of the North American Diocese by the Supreme
Church Authority of the Russian Orthodox Church, including the appoint-
ment of the ruling hierarchy in North America from the foundation of the
diocese until the Russian Revolution. We find nothing that indicates a
relinquishment of this power by the Russian Orthodox Church.58
This finding is the cornerstone of the opinion. However, the considerations
which compelled the finding are not clear. Both sides had introduced volumi-
nous evidence justifying their conflicting claims to control over the Cathedral.
Rather than evaluating the evidence to resolve the factual issues, the Court
simply assumed that the Russian Church had the right to control use of the
property. This assumption led to the characterization of the New York statute
as an unconstitutional transfer of control of property. Rather than resting the
opinion on these grounds, Mr. Justice Reed added another constitutional di-
mension to the case by attacking the statutory "transfer" as a violation of the
rule of separation between church and state. Mr. Justice Reed pointed out that
the Watson v. Jones principle - that the civil courts must defer to the church
authorities on ecclesiastical matters - was based on the value placed on sepa-
ration of church and state in American political thought. Admitting that Wat-
son v. Jones was not a constitutional decision, Mr. Justice Reed continued:
The opinion radiates, however, a spirit of freedom for religious organi-
zations, an independence from secular control or manipulation - in short,
power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
57. Article 5-C of New York's Religious Corporations Law provides that churches
established before or after the foundation of the metropolitan district, and which had been
established under the administration of either the mission (1793-1870), dioceses (1870-
1924) or the district (1924-present) were subject to the law. This obviously includes all
churches established by the Russian Orthodox Church, regardless of whatever claim its
hierarchy had of jurisdiction. N.Y. RELIGIOus CORP. LAW art. 5-C, §§ 105-07. See also 302
N.Y. at 26-27, 96 N.E2d at 69-71.
58. 344 U.S. at 120.
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church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to
select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we
think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part
of the free exercise of religion against state interference.59
This part of the opinion, various commentators have argued, raises Watson z'.
Jones to constitutional status.60 If this is so, the case represents a significant
constitutional extension, since it would make the first amendment guarantees
applicable to religious organizations as well as to individuals. Mr. Justice
Reed's reasoning, however, is hardly adequate to support such an extension.
His argument that religious organizations have a constitutional right to appoint
clergy obscures the basic issue in all church property disputes - the deter-
mination of the right to control use of the property. In Kedroff both sides were
admittedly free to appoint clergy, and in fact did so. 0'
'On remand, the New York Court of Appeals directed a new trial on the
issue of whether the Russian Church could function as anything except an arm
or agent of an anti-religious civil government, so that its appointees would not
be the proper trustees to administer the church property. 2 After hearing more
evidence, the New York Supreme Court found that the Russian Church was
a functioning religious order and that the Cathedral was under its control.m
The Court of Appeals reversed once more,6 4 using a common law implied trust
doctrine - that a court in the exercise of its discretion could replace trustees
who could not be relied upon to carry out the purposes of the trust. The Cathe-
dral "was subject to the implied trust that it must be used and employed ac-
59. Id. at 116.
60. See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOm 250 (1953); Mfark de Wolfe Howe,
The Juridical Status of Churches, I CONFERENCE PROCEEDiNGs, THE INsTrrTTE OF CURCH
AND STATE 6, 16 (Villanova University 1958); Howe, Forward: Political Theory and the
Nature of Liberty, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HIv. L. Ray. 91, 92-95 (1953);
Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Oz'cr Religious Issues, 20 Onuo ST. LJ. 503,
522-28 (1959).
61. Air. Justice Frankfurter saw the difficulty in this line of reasoning, and sought to
characterize the dispute as a struggle for "power to exercise religious authority." He
pointed out that "St. Nicholas Cathedral is not just a piece of real estate .... [but] the
seat and center of ecclesiastical authority." 344 U.S. at 121. In his view, courts, not legis-
latures, were alone empowered to settle these disputes "in strict subordination to the eccle-
siastical law of a particular church prior to a schism." Id. at 122. However, instead of
making a determination of the "ecclesiastical law" involved, Air. Justice Frankfurter simply
assumed administrative power to reside in the Russian Church:
Both parties to the present controversy agree that the present Patriarch is the legiti-
mately chosen holder of his office, and ... [he is acknowledged] ...by his co-
equals in the Eastern Confession, the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria,
Antioch, and Jerusalem, and by religious leaders throughout the world, including
the present Archbishop of York.
Id. at 125.
62. 306 N.Y. at 38, 114 N.E.2d at 197.
63. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 9 Miisc. 2d 1069, 166 N.Y.S2d 245 (Sup. Ct.
1957), aff'd mere., 6 App. Div. 2d 866 (1958).
64. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 164 N.E.2d 687 (1959).
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cording to the discipline, rules and usage of the Russian Orthodox denomina-
tion and for the'benefit of the members of its North American Diocese."05
Watson v. Jones was said to have a basic qualification that "The court must
always be careful to ascertain whether the central church authority really
exists or enjoys sufficient freedom of action to be able to function as such."00
The court found that "the Moscow Patriarchate enjoys at best a nominal and
conditional existence, at the sufferance of the Communist rulers of the Soviet
State .... " 67 The Russian Church was therefore held to be an unfit trustee.
Finally, the court argued that to award the Cathedral to the Moscow appointee
would involve a "violation of the constitutional protection against State [Rus-
sian] interference in the free exercise of religion."0 8 This neat twist, as well as
the common-law doctrine, failed to impress the Supreme Court. In St. Nicholas
Cathedral v. Kreshik,"9 the Court again reversed the New York Court of Ap-
peals in a memorandum opinion, citing Shelley v. Kraemcr 70 for the proposi-
tion that the court could not do what the legislature had been forbidden to do.
The decision of the New York courts, the Court stated, rested on the same
premises as the statute struck down in Kedroff - that the appointee of a
Communist-dominated church could not validly exercise his authority under
the common law of New York.
The basic flaw in the New York Court of Appeals' second opinion was that
it failed to recognize the importance of the Supreme Court's assumption that
the right to determine use of the Cathedral lay in the Russian Church. Thus,
on remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals did not pretend to
settle the question of control of property as such, but awarded the property to
the American Church solely on the grounds that the Russian Church was an
improper trustee. Had the New York court rested its decision on a finding of
which party had the right to determine use, the Supreme Court might have
been obliged to announce its own criteria for court determination of this crucial
issue. As it is, Kreshik may simply stand for the proposition that Communist
taint is no bar to control of church property.
The most surprising aspect of the Supreme Court decisions in Kedroff and
Kreshik was the use of first amendment language, which appears to be un-
necessary to reach the Court's conclusions. If the Court's finding that the
Russian Church had never relinquished administrative control over the Ameri-
can Church is to be taken seriously, it should have been dispositive of the case.
Under Watson v. Jones, if the Russian Church were found to have the right to
prescribe use of church property, the Court was bound to enforce that right.
Nor was the first amendment language in Kedroff necessary to invalidate the
statute, since if there had been a transfer, New York's action would have been
65. Id. at 205, 164 N.E.2d at 694.
66. Id. at 216, 164 N.E.2d at 700.
67. Id. at 214, 164 N.E2d at 699.
68. Id. at 217, 164 N.E.2d at 700.
69. 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
70. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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an unconstitutional taking, in the absence of compensation and a finding of pub-
lic purpose. The first amendment language was also unnecessary to justify the
"Kreshik opinion, since the fourteenth amendment obviously bars a court as
well as a legislature from accomplishing an unconstitutional tadng. Under
Reed's assumption of ownership the only possible relevance of the first amend-
ment language would lie in the fact that the injured party was a church.7 ' The
crucial constitutional clause should not have been the free exercise clause but
the due process clause.
The New York court's reading of the statute might raise a real first amend-
ment issue if the implied trust theory were accepted as a valid characterza-
tion of church methods of property control. The legislature, according to Judge
Conway, exercised its power over the appointment of New York trustees and
disqualified the Russian Church hierarchy on the grounds of Communist taint.
Such an action probably would be constitutional if a mere private trust were
involved 72 although in a case involving a religious trust there probably must
be a showing of "dear and present danger" to permit any state interference
on political grounds.73 In any case, since the Court did not accept the charac-
'terization of the New York court that the members of the church hierarchy
were trustees, this theory cannot support the first amendment language.
The Court could also have been saying in Kedroff that the New York Legis-
lature had no p6wer to determine the ownership of religious property because
the first amendment bars the state from taking any part in religious disputes.Y4
Under this theory any decision in this area involves, to some extent, both an
establishment of the religion of the winner and an interference with the free
exercise of the loser. This reading would account for the first amendment lan-
guage in Kedroff. The reference to Shelly v. Kraeincr in Krcshidk could then
be taken" to mean that involvement in religious disputes is forbidden to courts,
as well as to legislatures. If followed to its logical conclusion, however, this
argument would bar any court, including the Supreme Court, from deciding
-the case. The finding of Russian administrative authority may have been the
Court's way of restoring the status quo before New Yorks action, but in
restoring the status quo, the Supreme Court necessarily made a finding that
the Russian Church was entitled to the use of the Cathedral. Applying the
same logic used to bar New York court action, the Supreme Court must have
71. The same reasoning would hold that the robbery of a priest or minister violated
his rights to freedom of exercise of religion as well as "the laws against theft
72. See Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919); 1 Scott, Tausrs
§107 (2d ed. 1956), 4 id. § 387.
73. There is a hint of this in the majority opinion, 344 U.S. at 109-10; cf. Cantvell
v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
74. Mr. Justice Brennan has cited both Kedroff and Krehi as reaffirming Watson v.
Jones to the extent
that in order to give effect to the First Amendment's purpose of requiring on the
part of all organs of government a strict neutrality toward theological questions,
courts should not undertake to decide, these questions.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,243 (1963).
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violated the freedom of exercise of the American Church and established the
Russian Church. Another flaw in the logic underlying this theory might be
illustrated by imagining that the New York courts had refused to hear the
original suit. This refusal to act could be viewed as establishing the Russian
Church, whose appointees were in possession, and interfering with the freedom
of exercise of the members of the American Church. The persuasiveness of
this example can be heightened by hypothesizing that the party happening to
be in possession had no claim under any other theory to determine right of use
of the property.
Further, a constitutional doctrine prohibiting courts from settling religious
property disputes would have serious practical consequences. The state has a
legitimate interest in keeping title and ownership in land settled and secure.
This "housekeeping" interest requires that the state know at all times the
owners of property within its borders, so that injured persons may find re-
sponsible owners, and so that property may be freely alienable. The state also
has an interest in affording to disputants some recourse other than the sword
for settling their arguments, and the state alone has the authority to make and
enforce judgments between such disputants. If only from a practical point of
view, then, the first amendment should not be an absolute bar to a court's tak-
ing jurisdiction of a church property dispute.
Under any reasonable reading of the Kedroff and Kreshik opinions, then,
the Court's use of the first amendment language after it had assumed control
over the property to lie in the Russian Church was superfluous. The critical
determination in Kedroff, as it was in Master, was that of the right to pre-
scribe the use of the property. This is not to say that the first amendment has
no bearing on church property disputes. In fact, the Supreme Court's assump-
tion of control by the Russian Church obscured the actual first amendment
issues in the case. The first amendment is relevant in the beginning - in
determining the right to prescribe use of church property - not after that
determination has been made or assumed. For this reason, the various possible
rules for determining control over church property must be tested in the light
of first amendment limitations. Basically, the state can choose either of two
main avenues of approach to these church property problems: it can set up
more or less arbitrary rules of its own, declaring where, for the state's limited
purposes, control will be said to lie, or it can look to the individual church's
property rules and accommodate state law to these rules.
If the state imposes its own rules, it might adopt what could be called the
"formal title" doctrine - whoever holds title to the property has the right to
determine the use of the property.r Initially, the state would require the
75. Civil courts have on occasion approximated this approach. See Evangelical Lu-
theran Synod v. First English Lutheran Church, 47 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Okla. 1942),
rev'd, 135 F2d 701 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943). In that case the con-
gregation of the First English Lutheran Church had voted to secede from the Kansas
Synod and align itself with the Midwest Synod, similar in religion but different in ad-
ministrative respects. The Kansas Synod attempted to bar the secession, and both Syiods
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churches to designate a title-holder or group of title-holders for the church
property. The "formal title" approach would treat title-holders as owners in
fee simple rather than as trustees, and would ignore any restrictions placed
upon them by the church organization. The sole role of the state courts would
be finding the locus of formal title. The state would thus leave maintenance of
internal discipline entirely to the church. Application of this theory in Kedroff
would have resulted in victory for the American Church, who happened to
have formal title at the time of the suit.
The virtue of the "formal title" policy lies solely in its simplicity. This
method places so much power in the hands of the title-holder that it is an in-
vitation to anarchy within the church government. Further, it involves a re-
fusal to enforce firmly established equitable principles. A member who donates
money or property to his church clearly does not intend that it be subject to
the unfettered whim of the person who happens to have title to church prop-
erty. The inequitable results which could follow from the "formal title" theory
would seem to outweigh any advantages it may have from a purely adminis-
trative standpoint.
Another possible state-imposed rule would be proportional division of church
property in case of dispute. This theory would be based on the idea that each
member of a church possesses a certain equity in all church property through-
out the world. Although it may seem absurd to force a church to buy off sev-
eral disgruntled members, the appeal of this theory increases as the number
of church members in each quarreling faction increases. It might seem reason-
able to allow a substantial minority some compensation for the loss of its cus-
tomary use of church property. This proportional division theory, however,
would be almost impossible to implement.7 6 The court would first have to
decide whether a disgruntled party was in fact a menber of the church, and
then would have to tackle the problem of evaluating his share in the church
property.7 7 Even if either of these determinations were feasible, such a nle
appealed to the Lutheran High Commission. The Commission did not expressly adjudicate
the matter but volunteered the opinion that the "general exercise of [the right to with-
draw from a Synod and join another] should be discouraged as destructive of sound
church government of the United Lutheran Church in America." 47 F. Supp. at 958. The
court of appeals held that the Kansas Synod had no property interest in the church be-
cause the title, and therefore ownership, of the property resided in the church corporatiun.
135 F2d at 703. Carried to its logical limits, this decision would alluw the corporation
authorities to make any decisions concerning property use. Also see Bonacum v. Murphy,
71 Neb. 463, 104 N.W. 180 (1905).
76. Kentucky has a statute which seems on its face to prescribe a similar solution,
allowing each party in a church 'dispute to use the church property for worship a part of
the time "proportional to the members of each party." Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 273.120 (1960).
However, this statute has been limited by the courts to apply only for such time as required
for the proper ecclesiastical authority to determine which faction is entitled to the property
in question. Jones v. Johnson, 295 Ky. 707. 175 S.W.2d 370 (1943); Thomas v. Lewis,
224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W2d 255 (1928).
77. A related idea would have a court determine ownership by the source of funds
used to build and maintain a church. Such a determination is similar to a finding of the
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would probably lead to the multiplication of church quarrels, and an enormous
increase in the number of these quarrels reaching the civil courts.
Finally, the state could impose a polity upon a church. Both Maine and
Massachusetts, for example, have constitutional provisions that each congre-
gation shall have the power to elect its own pastor.78 These effectively give
property control to the congregation, since selection of clergy for a given bene-
fice is tantamount to allocating the right to prescribe use of church property.70
However, in imposing a congregational model, the court would have to decide
just who the members of the congregation really are. The court might apply
its own rules to determine congregational membership, a process which would
lead into even murkier waters than would an attempt to determine an individ-
ual's equity in church property. Alternatively, it could look to the church rules
for membership. In a hierarchical church, the church authorities will usually
have the power to determine membership; thus the court will often be in the
anomalous position of looking to the hierarchy for membership rules and to the
congregation in order to determine whether that body will follow the hier-
archy's property rules.
There are constitutional objections to each of the above schemes. An integral
part of any religion is its form of government. Essential to any church govern-
ment is the power to administer church property. If the state imposes a uni-
form system of religious land tenure, this imposition is a state establishment
of a power structure within the religious government.8 0 Such an establishment
is analogous to a state's imposition of a certain form of prayer on people of all
faiths, an act found unconstitutional in Engel v. Vitale.81 The imposition of a
particular form of property control on all churches alike is the source of the
constitutional infirmity, regardless of how many of the churches happen to use
equity* of an individual member, but is more sophisticated, since it takes into account the
sources of funds outside a congregation. The church, for example, might have been con-
structed partially with funds from the mother church, as was St. Nicholas Cathedral.
Parishes of hierarchical churches, however, frequently both give money to and receive it
from their dioceses. Unravelling all of these strands would present an even more difficult
task for the courts than determining an individual's equity.
78. ME. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3 (1954); MAss. CoNsT. § 113, art. xi (1951).
79. In other words there is a difference between appointing a bishop or pastor in
vacuo and having the power to appoint a bishop who will occupy a particular church or
cathedral.
80. Mr. justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kedroff makes the point that if
the state is allowed to say who will "control the common center of devotion," it will afford
the winner religious power through the use and occupancy of such church property. 344
U.S. at 122-23. However, Mr. justice Frankfurter's position is also open to question. The
purely factual observation can be made that St .Nicholas Cathedral had been in possession
of John Kedroff and his family for twenty years prior to the lawsuit. Kedroff and his sons
were members of neither the American or Russian Church, but the "Living," or "Reno-
vated" church, which had gone out of existence shortly after its formation. The Kedroffs
had gained no power to govern either the American or Russian Church. Thus the state's
determination of property control is not necessarily decisive in church government strug-
gles.
81. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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similar forms of property control. In essence, the state is making rules for the
religious government of the church, a clear violation of the establishment prin-
ciple. Further, state-imposed rules raise grave questions of freedom of exercise
of religion. When a state imposes on the church a different form of control
over land from that consented to by the church member, it is impinging on
his freedom of exercise of religion. Also, if the church itself is considered to
be vested with constitutional rights, 82 as was suggested in Kedroff, then a
fortiori the church's freedom of exercise has been curtailed as well. Unlike the
establishment argument, however, the free exercise argument applies only
when the state-imposed system differs from that of the church.
The constitutional objections may be lessened if the state takes the second
avenue of approach, that of looking to the church's own rules. If the state does
not arbitrarily impose a uniform system of land tenure on all churches, it must
necessarily find rules for property control within the existing structure of the
church government. In its search for these rules, courts should avoid entangle-
ment in concepts such as "title" and "ownership." Actual title is usually rela-
tively unimportant to a church; ownership may consist of many separate in-
-terests. The property rights which are significant are the rights of appointment
of hierarchy and clergy to given benefices, the right to determine membership
in the congregation, and the right to administer the church finances and pre-
scn'be discipline. It is unprofitable to characterize "ownership" or "title" as
the grail for which the courts are to search. "Control," "power to adjudicate,"
or "power to prescribe use" seem more useful ways of saying the same thing.
A middle ground between state imposition of uniform church property rules
and an attempt to apply the church's own rules would be the trust theory: the
church property is impressed with a trust for the use and benefit of the church
members. Under the English formms of this trust theory the church members
are defined as those who adhere to the faith of the founding fathers, because
it is assumed that the donors of the church property intended that it be used
by the church as it existed at the time of the donation. Thus the English courts
in the event of a church property dispute examine the contentions of each side
to determine which represents the faith of the founders. This approach has
the advantage of reaching the actual issues of the dispute rather than applying
some artificial state rule, but the court may not be the most competent body
to decide the complicated issues of an ecclesiastical quarrel, especially if the
dispute involves arcane theology.8 The application of the English rule also
stifles natural development of church doctrine. Further, the rule rests upon the
questionable premise that the donors of church property intended that the
82. See text accompanying note 60 supra. Also see Howe, Foreword: Political Theory
and the Nature of Liberty, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HIv. L. Rnv. 91, 92-95
(1953). See also address of Mark de Wolfe Howe, The Juridical Status of Churches, I
CoNREmcE PROCEEDINGs, THE INsrnrru OF CHURCH Am STATE 6 (Villanova Univer-
sity 195&). -
83. See text at notes 10-14 supra.
84. See Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (Scot).
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church remain static, and thus imagines that the donors attached strings to
their gift which prevent the church from ever exercising full dominion over
its property.
The trust theory can be modified to avoid some of the drawbacks of the
English version. Rather than assuming that the intent of the donor was to give
to a body which would adhere strictly to the faith of the founders, it is more
plausible to recognize that the donor foresaw the possibility of change. Thus
in applying the modified trust doctrine the courts would assume that actions of
the church authorities were valid unless plainly ultra vires. Though this theory
makes possible some evolution in the church doctrine, it still involves the court
in the determination of whether the church body making the change was com-
petent to do so. For instance, the court might have to decide whether a given
rule or doctrine was so fundamental to the church that no church authority
could change it, or it might have to decide the even more difficult question of
whether there actually had been a change. In addition, this modification does
not overcome the basic difficulty with the trust theory - that it assumes, prob-
ably contrary to fact, that the donor of church property has not made a complete
gift but has retained some strings over the church property. Even if this as-
sumption is valid, there remains the policy question of whether gifts to churches
should be regarded as incomplete in the absence of provisions so stating. Final-
ly, in those cases where the implied trust is a court-created fiction - where
the original donor did not so condition his gift - application of either of the
trust theories represents an imposition of a state- created rule of land tenure,
and a disregard for the decision of the church authorities, who govern by the
consent of the members.
Both trust theories also contain constitutional infirmities. Application of the
English trust theory clearly represents an establishment since it requires the
court to examine the beliefs of the rival claimants and to choose between them
on the basis of an implied - and often fictional - trust. The choice of the
court represents state sanction of a particular doctrine and therefore estab-
lishes the religion of the winner. The modified trust theory establishes a re-
ligion in the same way, since the court must again investigate the doctrines of
the church to decide which are fundamental and hence beyond change. On the
other side of the coin, both trust doctrines deprive both the church as a whole
and its individual members of the freedom to exercise their religion, since use
of particular church property is often connected with religious practice. Con-
ditioning the right to use property on adherence to certain religious beliefs
restricts grievously the rights of the individual members to worship as they
please, and the right inherent in a church to grow and change.85
A second theory assumes that gifts to churches are complete and that prop-
erty control lies somewhere in the governing body of the church. The mem-
bers of the church are assumed to have given their consent to be governed by
85. See McGregor, Church and State, Associations and Corporate Personality, 61
S. An. L.J. 133 (1944). Compare arguments by Haldane, K.C. in Free Church of Scot-
land v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C. at 608-11 (Scot.).
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the church's own rules, as interpreted by the church authorities. This is the
underlying theory of Watson v. Jones, which, to be sure, embodies a most
expansive reading of the members consent. As the cases modifying Watson
V. Jones illustrate, however, it is unreasonable to assume that a member con-
sented to have the church rules interpreted unfairly or arbitrarily by the church
authorities86 A doctrine of review based on these considerations would allow
the church authorities to interpret the church laws, usage, doctrine and juris-
diction. The function of the civil court would be limited to determining whether
the action of the church tribunal was patently unfair or on its face violated the
church's laws. This approach presupposes that the church tribunal with the
power to prescribe use of the property has been identified. It thus would solve
disputes similar to Watson v. Jones, where both parties recognize a single
church tribunal as haiing the power to control property. In situations like
Kedroff, however, where there are two rival factions, each claiming the right
of control over the property, the court must choose between them before it can
proceed to test the decision of the proper tribunal against the principles derived
from Watson v. Jones. Choosing between rival factions can be most difficult,
but there are guidelines available. As Master 87 illustrates, the court should go
back and find a time when the control of the property was undisputed. Pro-
ceeding from there, the court can inquire whether the undisputed control over
the property had ever been surrendered or lost, either by cession of the prop-
erty to another group, or by relinquishment of control over the property under
the principle of laches or estoppel.
The latter principle has been demonstrated in a state courtp after the
Supreme Court decision in Kreshik. A dispute similar to the Kcdroff situation
developed involving a quarrel between the American Church and the Russian
Church over the use and possession of St. Peter and St. Paul Church in Lorain,
Ohio. The church had been under Russian leadersldp until 1925, when it joined
the American Church. In 1957 the church engaged George Burdikoff as pastor.
After he had been installed, he announced that he had switched his allegiance
to the Russian Church. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that Burdikoff did not
have the right of possession. The rationale was that the Russian Church was
barred from asserting the right to prescribe use, since it had not asserted its
right to control in the intervening 32 years, during which time the parish had
adhered to the American Church. This case, and Master, illustrate the com-
plexity of the issues involved in the initial determination of the right to control
86. Of course, these rules must be interpreted within the context of church law, which
might itself contain elements which seem unfair or arbitrary to a layman. However, a
member can have no complaint if he is dealt with in accordance with church law extant
at the time he joined the church. Presumably his consent to be governed includes this body
of laws.
87. Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 124 F2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941).
88. Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic St. Peter and St. Paul's Church v. Burdikoff,
117 Ohio App. 1, 189 N.E.2d 451 (1962).
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use of church property. But they also give grounds for hope that the courts
can evolve workable standards when they recognize the problem.
Yet even the policy of state deference to church decisions involves constitu-
tional problems. The establishment clause can be read to prohibit state aid to
any or all religions.8 9 By enforcing church decisions, the argument would go,
the state is establishing the religion of those whose decisions it enforces. This
extreme disestablishment position would only be satisfied by denying the state
the right to help churches in any way. The logical consequences of this theory
would require the refusal by a state to adjudicate boundary disputes between a
church and its neighbors, or even to extinguish fires on church property. These
examples show the discriminatory and impractical nature of this reading of the
establishment clause. Moreover, it might be argued that a court by denying
its jurisdiction over church disputes would, in effect, be establishing the religion
of the ultimate winner of the contest.90
A more moderate reading of the establishment clause would maintain that
the state must remain strictly neutral, neither aiding nor hindering any or all
religions.91 Under this position all rules by which churches are treated differ-
ently from other non-profit voluntary organizations are subject to criticism.
By this yardstick, the strict Watson v. Jones rule with its complete deference
to church authorities is objectionable since other non-profit voluntary organiza-
tions are not absolutely immune from state imposed standards. On the other
hand, the doctrine which would have the courts look more closely to fairness
and good faith criteria seems to correspond more closely with the rules gov-
erning other voluntary associations.9 2
The rule of Watson v. Jones as modified by subsequent case law also affords
the maxim freedom of exercise to individual members of a church. As Mr.
Justice Miller emphasized, the power of the churches to govern is derived from
89. One of the classic definitions of the establishment clause was embodied in a dictum
by Air. Justice Black, speaking for the Court in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another....
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate In
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Id. at 15, 16.
See also the dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 646 (1943) ; dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 28 (1947); PFz--mE, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDoM 62 et passiin (1953).
90. The logical extension of this line of reasoning culminates in the argument that by
insuring the religious liberty of churches, the government has given aid to religions, thus
violating the establishment principle. See Hoxw, op. cit. supra note 82 at 22-23.
91. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 230 (1963).
92. See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43
HAv. L. REv. 993 (1930) ; Developments it the Law, Judicial Control of Actions o Pri-
vate Associations, 76 HAv. L. REv. 983 (1963).
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the consent of the members, who agree to be governed by the church rulesYP
If the state defers to the decisions of church authorities made in accordance
with these rules, the state is merely enforcing the original consent of the mem-
ber, and thus cannot be accused of depriving him of the freedom to exercise his
religion. If the church as a whole can claim a constitutional right to freedom of
exercise, it must be derived from the members through the aggregate of their
consent. Therefore the church can only claim the protection of the freedom of
exercise clause so long as its decisions are nade within the framework of its
own rules. It is easy to imagine a case in which the church itself by misman-
agement, fraud or bad faith interferes with the free exercise of religion by cer-
tain of its own members. Wrongful expulsion would be one example. The fact
that there can be a direct clash between the church and a member, both claiming
protection under the freedom of exercise clause, indicates that the power of the
churches should be limited to the quantum of consent given it by its members.
Since Watson v. Jones, as modified by the later case law, should be read to
impose only these limits, it does not impinge on the freedom of exercise of the
church or of its individual members.
This examination of the possible theories designed to identify the church
tribunal with the power to control property reveals the basic dilemma inherent
in Kedroff. The Court in that case failed to realize that no matter what methods
are used to settle church property disputes, each one will be subject to first
amendment attack. Even Watson v. Jones, the case purportedly raised to con-
stitutional status, can be challenged as an establishment of religion.
Placed in this position, the courts must seek a solution which avoids as far
as possible the strictures of both the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause, which protects the church from arbitrary action by the state and the in-
dividual members from arbitrary action by the church, and which accommodates
the state "housekeeping" interests yet respects the many different forms by
which different churches hold and control their property. This task is bnade
more difficult by the various and sometimes conflicting interpretations of the
establishment clause. If the establishment clause is looked upon as creating an
absolute wall between church and state, then all of the possible rules are subject
to criticism, because each involves the state to some extent in church affairs. The
"formal title" rule is perhaps least objectionable from this point of view, since
the state need not deal with either the theology or the administrative rules of
the church, but looks solely to the locus of title. However, the "formal title"
doctrine creates an establishment from another point of view, since it establishes
the religion of the title-holder. The most objectionable rule from an "absolute
wall" point of view is strict adherence to Watson v. Jones. This rule gives the
church plenary power over church property and allows the church to use the
courts to enforce its decrees. Between these two extremes lies an area in which
93. 80 U.S. (13 WalL) at 729. The church may, on the other hand, maintain that its
authority is a delegation of Divine Authority. However, the state cannot recognize Divine
Authority without violating the establishment principle. See School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 214-22 (1963).
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the courts test the church action to see that it meets some requirements of
fairness and good faith. The difficulty here is that as the court avoids blind and
unquestioning establishment of church decrees, it drifts toward an equally
obnoxious alternative - that of deciding theological questions. Indeed, by con-
tinuing the process of choosing different interpretations of the establishment
clause, each theory advanced can be tarred with the first amendment brush.
A court could deal with the dilemma created by the various readings of the
establishment clause by treating it as of secondary importance. The court would
then ground its choice of method primarily within the framework of the free
exercise clause. Significantly, only the Watson v. Jones principles as modified
by later case law are wholly compatible with the free exercise clause. All of the
other tests conflict to greater or lesser extent with the free exercise of religion.
Of these other tests, the modified trust theory is least objectionable; but it still
may result in a court's restricting the ability of a church and its members to
adopt new doctrines or beliefs. Strengthening the conclusion derived from the
free exercise standpoint is the fact that the test derived from Watson v. Jones
has a long history of relatively successful application. The test does not involve
the courts to any significant extent with theological disputes, and although it
may sometimes be difficult to find the body within a church with the power to
control property, the case law illustrates that this problem, when recognized,
can be solved.94
If the establishment clause is taken into account, the latest interpretation of
that clause by the Supreme Court supports the selection of the principles de-
rived from Watson v. Jones. Under this reading,95 the constitution demands
strict neutrality by the state toward all churches. All the tests other than Wat-
son v. Jones as modified erect special rules of decision for church property dis-
putes, while the Watson v. Jones formula most closely approximates the gen-
eral body of law applicable to all non-profit voluntary associations. Indeed, the
onl view of the establishment clause which strongly conflicts with the prin-
ciples derived from Watson v. Jones is the strict separation interpretation
the "absolute wall" theory. Yet this is the least acceptable theory of the estab-
94. See Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 124 F2d 622 (1st Cir. 1944) ; Romanian
Orthodox Missionary Episcopate v. Trutza, 120 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1952), all'd, 205
F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic St Peter and St. Paul's Church
v. Burdikoff, 117 Ohio App. 1, 189 N.E2d 451 (1962) (another case which could have been
handled more sensibly if the problem had been recognized) ; Evangelical Lutheran Synod
v. First English Lutheran Church, 47 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Okla. 1942), reed, 135 F.2d 701
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943). In the last case, the highest church tribunal,
recognized by both factions, had withheld decision as to whether a congregation could
switch allegiance from one Synod to another within the church. The court of appeals held
that neither Synod had a property interest in the church property, since title was in the
church corporation. A more practical handling of the case would have been to recognize
that the highest church body could prescribe the use of the property, but had not done so.
In effect, the court of appeals could have remanded the case to the highest church tribunal
since it had the power to make a decision binding upon the civil courts.
95. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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lishment clause,96 and every rule for decision of church property disputes would
be suspect under this interpretation.
There is still another interpretation of the establishment clause, which seems
most sensible in the context of church property disputes. This view realizes
that various interpretations of the establishment clause may conflict with each
other, and with the free exercise clause. Therefore, it says, rather than applying
each clause in isolation, an attempt should be made to reconcile them, in order
to develop a unitary and internally consistent reading of the first amendment.
Because the establishment clause can be self-contradictory, the key to a unitary
concept of the first amendment is to treat the free exercise clause as paramount,
and the establishment clause as primarily a means of safeguarding freedom of
exercise.97 The test derived from Watson v. Jones is even more attractive under
this theory. Alone of all the possible tests for resolving church property dis-
putes, it maximizes freedom of exercise for both the church as a whole and its
members, and impinges marginally, if at all, on traditional establishment con-
cepts. This method represents a fair solution for both the church and the in-
dividual church member, and a workable accommodation between the interests
of the state in property within its borders and the interests of the church in
administering its property with a minimum of interference.
In retrospect, although the Supreme Court opinion in Kedroff assumed the
very issue it purported to decide, its elevation of Watson v. Jones to constitu-
tional status served a valuable purpose. It focused attention on the first amend-
ment problems latent in church property disputes, and it forced re-examination
of a hundred-year-old doctrine in the light of modem conditions. Although the
Kedroff-Kreshik opinions raised more questions than they answered, their
choice of the Watson v. Jones principles has proved to be correct.
96. Under this theory the establishment and free exercise clauses would always be in
opposition, since enforcing a church decision would establish a religion, while refusing to
enforce a church decision would establish the religion of the dissenters from that decision.
See text accompanying and following note 74 supra.
97. This is not to say that the establishment clause must be ignored. Its application,
however, would always be determined with reference to the free exercise clause. The most
complete statement of this position is that of Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, in School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308-20 (1963).
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